OF THINE EYE I AM EYEBEAM: ON INTENTIONS, MEDIATIONS AND DIALOGUES IN CINEMA

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DOI: 10.25768/20.04.01.016

ABSTRACT: This article aims at understanding the complexity involved in film interpretation. Thus, by joining Peirce’s theory of interpretants and Edgar Morin’s and Jorge Vieira’s systemic theories, our intention herein is to observe the dynamics involved in the potentiality and intentionality of the film sign and its real effectivity upon the mind of the interpreter. In the end, the article concludes that by generating ideas to the mind of the interpreter, the film makes the flux of thought a whirl that expands itself and reverberates through various interpretive layers, that is, the filmic interpretation effects itself in the mind by means of a net that consolidates itself by fluctuating multiple-processes: either emotional, energetic, or logic ones.

KEYWORDS: cinema; semiotic-systemic; film interpretation.

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The film reflects profoundly the man who made it. François Truffaut

1 On diagrams, projections and guessing

The association of shots in a determined sequence creates in the mind a meaning, which is determined by the verification of its connection, generating a necessity of mediating each shot and its relation with the linear disposition of facts/framings. Thus, that ascribed order (read as intentionality), from one shot to the other, creates an interpretant which is responsible for making the mind infer and recognize those connections in a diagrammatic form and to produce (effect) an understanding of the whole, or area of information.

In this short excerpt we have all the elements involved in the process through which the degrees and levels of interpretants act along the mediation with the film sign. However, this process deserves to be better clari-
fied in detail. It is clear that the potential interpretant and the final interpretant are *in abstracto* whereas the dynamic interpretant is *in concreto*. (Santaella, 2000: p. 76) This means that both the potentiality, and the projection or finality linked to these two types of interpretants are marked by the possibility – *in futuro* – of finding a mind, or more, which are apt to mediate the ideas and information contained in the sign. Thus, the understanding on the formation of the film sign becomes fundamental to any study on film interpretation, for the film could not be seen as something isolated from such potential and finality contained in its construction, that is, it could not be seen as something independent of its production and intentionality. So, all its complexity should be highlighted.

However, the real effect of the sign occurs, in fact, at the level of the dynamic interpretant. Such interpretant is associated with the meeting of the interpreting mind and the sign. It is no longer a possibility *in futuro*, but an actualization, an occurrence, a happening, a definiteness or a real connection with it. Relative, subject to criticism and to corrections, the dynamic interpretant is always a necessary, and, at the same time, fallible actualization of the sign. Therefore, open to readjustments; matter of fact, readjustments that are immersed in a dialectic relation between the potentiality (inscribed in the sign), on the one hand, and the finality (idealized limit), on the other. (see Santaella, 2000: 76)

According to Santaella (2000: 78-87), the dynamic interpretant is internally divided in three instances: the emotional interpretant, the energetic interpretant, and the logic interpretant. The emotional interpretant is the first semiotic effect produced in the contact between the mind and the sign. This first effect of a sign is the *feeling* provoked by it. (Peirce *in* Santaella, 2000: p. 78) It is not merely the emotive charge linked to it, but, especially, the quality of feeling that many times cannot be analyzed nor translated, thus of a vague and undefined sense, yet with a high value of expressivity, which the sign provokes in the mind. By the way, to this type of interpretant are linked the moments in which any kind of explanation is not enough to describe what, in fact, the sign projects on the mind. The contemplation becomes the only possible alternative, for any attempt to try to analyse it would end up dissolving its original state, transforming it in a mere and distant translation.

The energetic interpretant is associated to an act in which some energy is spent. In fact, this interpretant is linked to an effort –, muscular or mental (Peirce *in* Santaella, 2000: 78) - of the mind faced with the physical objects that act upon it and upon which one acts. Such clash and conviviality demand, from us, an energy and effort which, on the one hand, alert us to the fact that the physical objects do not depend on us; and, on the other, such resistance warns us about our existence and identity, for we respond to these in conformity to our beliefs. (Peirce, 1998: 195) By the way, the logic interpretant has as its effect the thought or general understanding produced by the sign. Thus, to think “(...) is to make inferences, to establish consequences from certain premisses, to move according to a general rule.” (Santaella, 2000: 79) The final goal of the logic interpretant would be, exactly, to bring about a change of habit or of beliefs, that is, the change of general rules that mould our means of interpreting.

As we have seen, the emotional interpretant will deal with the feeling produced by the sign; the energetic interpretant, with the mental or physical effort demanded by the sign; and, lastly, the logical interpretant, with the intellective necessity provoked by the sign. So, the place of the interpreter is exactly in the realm of the dynamic interpretant, for, in its three instances, they are contained in the semiotic moments through which the action of the sign – or semioses – develops in the mind. (Santaella, 2000: 84) Matter of fact, exactly ‘semiotic moments’ because, in its flux – such emotional, energetic and logic – interpretants move, change and transform them-
selves, not having fixed delimitations of their borders. In fact, there are moments in which the emotional is highlighted; others in which it is the energetic one that is called to act; or still, in others, in which the logical one needs to be triggered and to surface. Therefore, as the term dynamic denotes, such interpretants cross the mind in a constant interaction, transformation, association and complementarity.

On the other hand, in its relation to this purpose idealized to the sign, this triad, internal to the dynamic interpretant, will dialog directly with the possibility-limit of projection and intentionality associated to the final interpretant. Thus, Peirce proposes three patterns (values or ideals) that guide the movement of signic transformation or self-correction of the interpretations: the conjectural, the propositional and the argumental.

The final interpretant, whose impetus promotes and highlights the qualities of the sign, that which in it is unique, singular, different and admirable, is associated to the production of qualities of feeling (Santaella, 2000: 85) to which Peirce called the rematic or conjectural quality, exactly owing to the fact that such interpretant acts principally at the level of suggestion (Peirce, 1998: 192).

In this game between the dynamic interpretant – the semiotic place of the interpreter – and a final interpretant at the level of the conjectural one, we have the semiotic effect turned toward the ludic exercise, that is, the experience that allows the mind to visualize possibilities, assotiations of ideas, through the free play of similarities. German poet and philosopher Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) knew that the esthetic education of man was important to reason, but he was not able to tell, exactly, why (Schiller, 2002: 56, 57 and 113). Peirce places Esthetics as the first stage among the Normative Sciences and states that it directly influences Logic (reasoning). It is not by chance that the diagrammatic exercise of the free association of ideas is that which allows the mind to weave hypotheses.

The work of art – common place to this kind of conjectural final interpretant – flies above its author exactly for it has the capacity to contain in itself a multiplicity of qualities that allow the ludic game. It is, therefore, an open work for having that in futuro potentiality to generate new conjectures. For that very reason, it has no commitment with truth and falsity, it brings about the possibility of an open game. Therefore, to look for some message contained in the work of art is to look for truths where there are only possibilities of associating with other ideas. Unlike reality, which demands from the interpreter responses and representations with a high degree of exactness, the work of art is open to fallibilism, that is, to failures in interpretation, and it is therefore, especially, an exercise of weaving hypotheses, of imagining new routes without any commitment with the real.

Thus, that capacity which generates possibilities tied to the conjectural final interpretant will inspire both artists and scientists, forging, as time goes by, its sensitivities when faced with phenomena, in the act of mediation and of semioses. Therefore, in Art, Esthetics is connected to abduction, generating speculation and speculative hypotheses; fallibilism seems to reign, for each mind comes up with a different reading, echoing the ontological liberty of Art, for chance operates therein with interpretations and associations, which allows for, at each reading, new relations and connections to come up: therefore a new work of art does not exhaust itself, but points at a continuum free of possibilities, hovering over time, refeeding itself given the potentiality contained in the sign of Art. That leads to a creative synechism, that is, a continuity of reinterpretations that spreads from generation to generation.

The propositional final interpretant has its nature first and foremost turned to happenings, facts, evidences, conflicts, efforts, actions-reactions and resistences. Therefore, it has as its finality an ethical-practical character (Santaella, 2000: 85), that is, to make possible the observation of the conduct which, primarily,
deals with the attitudes and the choices when faced with events in which the characters in one film, for example, are involved. In this aspect, Aristotle (2005: 36) is enlightening: “The characters (or signs) allow one to qualify man, but it is upon its action that his happiness or unhappiness depends. The action, therefore, is not destined to imitate the characters, but, through acts, the characters are already represented.” Thus, it is through the acts of characters that we envision what they really are like. In fact, it is after the experience of observing the conflicts and what happens around the characters, as well as their choices and attitudes, when faced with the facts, that one can infer the quality of those characters.

So, the identification with certain characters goes through the sieve of a moral approval, for the conduct of such characters is similar or even understandable in the eyes of the spectator. There is also the question of admirability involved, for the approval or sympathy toward the character passes through the esthetic affinity. This means that, given the circumstances, if the spectator were in that same situation, he would be able to have the same attitudes. Peirce clarifies:

(...) an ultimate end to a deliberately adopted course of action – that is, a reasonably adopted one – must be a state of things that reasonably recommends itself in itself, besides any ulterior consideration. It ought to be an admirable ideal, having the only kind of goodness that such ideal can have, that is, the esthetic goodness. From this point of view, that which is morally good, appears as a particular kind of that which is esthetically good (Peirce, 2000: 201 and 202).

Thus, the identification with the character becomes a deliberately adopted action, for the attitudes of the character are the ones that one would reasonably recommend to oneself if, by any chance, one were in a similar situation. However, such final interpretant –, called dicent, or propositional interpretant –, deals with the general types of situations, happenings and events in which the characters are involved in crises that demand crucial decisions for the survival of one or more characters. In fact, such Ethical-practical principle becomes prominent when we observe the conduct of the characters when faced with crises.

Thus, something becomes unbalanced, breaks the horizon of the protagonist and all of a sudden it makes him look for alternatives or consistent hypotheses so as to reestablish such balance, which is only resumed as that character starts his journey, through the unknown, through risk and, especially, without safe ground to his choices; however, it is a journey which offers him new possibilities and perspectives, which, at last, means new knowledge, attributes, values and, mainly, learning. Therefore, at the end, what one observes is the chance in the life of that character, to acquire some positive or negative trait, or even an ambiguous one. Yet, it is the clashes, doubts, hesitations, and choices in critical moments, and especially the manner how such moments are overcome by the character – the ethical-practical trait – that make him or her admirable to the point that the spectator establishes a connection with the character, through the mechanism of identification.

As for the argumental final interpretant, which guides its course in time by means of a set of consistent logical interpretants, which are, in turn, evaluated, discussed and validated or refuted, that one has a guiding line which is critical-pragmatic in nature (Santaella, 2000: 85) In fact, in this level of intentionality resides the possibility of change or the fixation of new habits and beliefs, that is, the film would transcend the screen and would affect the conduct of the spectator, would change his or her conceptions and thoughts. It could even influence new film directors, social contexts and/or the life of people in a given society. One example of this process occurred when the Italian Neo-Realist films, the French Nouvelle Vague ones and of the New Cinema ap-
peared and spread all over the world, awakening new habits of production, and articulations of discourse. Which means “(...) that the only mental effect that can thus be produced and which is not a sign, having, nevertheless, a general application, is a change of habit, a modification of the tendencies of the action of a person (...)” (Peirce, 1998: 150)

For Aristotle, chance, as a dramatic resource, meant lack of talent on the part of the poet (2005: 45) and greater admiration came to the one who knew how to visualize the plot in its details (2005: 63) and still to develop the outcome with mastery, for it was a must to possess the two merits. (2005: 67) Thus, it is by means of such punctuated internal logicity, developed by the emotive-energetic-logical involvement that the purgation of the emotions (catharsis) is reached. Therefore, it is the ensembled logical consistency of the interrelationships of the narrative that flows toward that process. Especially, it is the manner in which the story is exhibited in the film that allows the mind to arrive at the concept or argument as if something were glimpsed at, discovered and concluded by the latter. There is, here, an evident learning process, and an accumulation of knowledge; however, such process occurs by means of a prominently aesthetic experience, i.e., by means of the admirable, for the organization of all elements that make up the story is of notorious beauty. (Vieira, 2008: 96)

Thus, the happenings and facts that occur in the film affect the mind of the spectator, to the extent that he or she is obliged to conjecture ideas, (Peirce, 1998: 153) which suggest new associations and arouse the imagination. (Peirce, 1998: 152) Therefore, the fact that the mind follows the example, the course of one or more characters, supplies certain experiences that act upon the mind. Thus, at “(...) each new instance, which is related to one experience supporting an induction, leads to the restrengthening of the association of ideas – that internal habit –, being in that association which consists in the tendency in believing in the inductive conclusion.” (Peirce, 1998: 151)

Therefore, by following the film narrative, the mind is affected by the experiences shown and articulated in the film, and as they are shown, certain conjectures are made; if such associations of ideas support the verification and approval – induction – such ideas spread in the mind to the extent that they become an internal tendency, thus becoming a new habit.

However, in that case-limit, (Peirce, 1998: 156-157) in which the spectator is really affected by the work, i.e., it is no longer a mere entertainment or hobby, but an experience that gives him the reeducation of his or her sensitivity, a reformulation of his or her conduct and a restructuring of his thoughts and concepts concerning the world around him or her. It cannot be seen as an indoctrination of the mind by a certain type of idea, such as is the case with totalitarian governments or which certain imperialist ambitions tend to produce, but as offering the mind of the spectator some ludic experiences, able to awaken, by means of the use, prominently, of abduction –, but also of deduction and induction –, new reflections, shedding new light upon the humanity and the universe. (see Peirce, 1998: 69)

Indeed, the ludic exercise of detachment from reality, toward various worlds, happens whether one is reading a book, listening to a song, seeing a play, for example, and it is something fundamental to mental activity, for it happens with the light that is necessary in the exercise of the formulation of hypotheses. Matter of fact, as Vieira illustrates, (2007: 26) there is, in every scientific hypothesis, some degree of fiction; therefore, what makes one hypothesis more apt to be adopted is its degree of coherence with reality.

Peirce observes further that: “[O]ur guessing faculty (for the formulation of hypotheses) corresponds to the flying and musical powers of the birds, i.e., it is for us what they are for them: the best of our merely instinctive powers” (Peirce in Santaella, 2004: 105). Nevertheless, this instinctive process of the formulation of hypothesis is similar to that of the ludic
experience objectified by the esthetic fruition of a work of Art. So, by exploring possible worlds, (see Vieira, 2008: 78) such process allows that ideas get together and generate new perspectives, new outlooks, new reorganizations, leaking out into the conduct of a person, changing his or her sensitivity and thoughts.

In this sense, the reason for a work to attract one’s attention more than another, is in its capacity to arouse ample and extensive admirability, to attract a larger amount of minds, as can be observed in Aristotle, (2005: 43) the work of Art is a general type, like philosophy, therefore, it must be pregnant with qualities whose objective is a continuous and inexhaustible source of reflections and interpretations, i.e., it must contain within itself a continuum of interpretants, a finality that overflows and drains a series of interpreters. Thus, in its general level, certain films have the capacity to influence other films, other arts and societies, and, especially, science and knowledge as a whole. Exactly owing to the capacity to awaken new ideas in society, new questionings, new discourses, imaginary worlds, and to weave new relations once unforeseen.

The film, therefore, becomes a cultural reference that defines itself as a waterbed in the field of the arts, and, who knows, in the field of science itself. In fact, its legacy drains through other cultural products in a continuum of reflections, for this legacy is nothing but a continuum of interpretants, a finality that overflows and drains a series of interpreters. Thus, in its general level, certain films have the capacity to influence other films, other arts and societies, and, especially, science and knowledge as a whole. Exactly owing to the capacity to awaken new ideas in society, new questionings, new discourses, imaginary worlds, and to weave new relations once unforeseen.

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Every man has an identity that transcends a lot the mere animal – an essence, a meaning, no matter how subtle it may be. He may not know his own essential meaning; of his eye he is its eyebeam. But the fact that he truly has this identity projected – like a word – it is the true and exact expression of the fact of sympathy, feeling of camaraderie – along with all the non-egotistical interests – and all that which makes us feel that he has an absolute value. (...) his own thought in another mind – I do not say immediately conscious – is happy in him, he feels that in some degree he is there. (Peirce, 2000: 309-310, our emphasis)

On account of that, the film-maker and his team do nothing but to conduct us to his thoughts and reflections, ideas and questionings, concepts and arguments; yet, such abstractions appear in the form of the film discourse. In each colour, texture, costume, staging, light, shot, juxtaposition of images, etc., found in the work, one finds the moments of doubts, decisions, desires, clashes, strategies and of intentions, though the interpretations are open, many times far from what these authors had planned; ergo, the film is, especially, an identity projected upon the mind of the spectator, in fact, of his eye it is eyebeam.

Thereupon, the cinema, in its envolvement with the interpreter, will produce final interpretants that act in three instances: the conjectural, the propositional and the argumental instances. The conjectural or rematic one deals with the incompleteness of the signic fragments and the suggestion that objetifies the mind in completing them. It is, exactly, in this conjecturing that the sign of art will make its residence. Thus, it is at this point that the cinematographic esthetic fruition comes in.

As for the proposition, it is that kind of argument that is connected to events; but its function is only to demonstrate them, to bring them to the surface so the mind focus on them.
It does not affirm the truth or falsity of what is highlighted; it only realizes, therefore, it is a particular that calls one’s attention. So, the film shows and follows a story, no matter how developed and well-articulated the dialogue that is inserted during the film, to give it a rhetoric character, its ground still gravitates in offering the mind a series of premises, events. Thence, each premise/event one follows during the film becomes a fact that soon, by observing the relations that the assemblage/symbol orders, the mind tries to understand by means of diagrammatic thought – formulating hypotheses and probable propositions – where the story is following, to what is beyond that which appears, which are the existing connections among those facts, etc.

The argumentation, general idea, concept, which generates and organizes the whole film, that generality, therefore, that symbol, has to be understood in the following manner: “(...) it should mean one thing that runs along with, such as (plunger) it is a thing that runs within something.” (Peirce, 2000: 72) As a law, it is something abstract in nature that organizes the facts, giving them meaning, it is liable to be experienced owing to its presence in the organization of the facts. As a result, the mind identifies and recognizes that there is a logic in operation behind the narrative, that it runs along, within, open, to accomplish inferences, abstractions, verifications, refutations, adoptions and, especially, learning. Just like a scientific investigation, the mind tries to understand what is behind the facts, ergo “(...) the manner in which the interpreter conducts the inquiry will depend to a great extent on the nature of the interest it has in it.” (Peirce, 1998: 159)

In fact, the conclusion, or denouement, achieves the proportion at which the catarsis points, for it is as if the interpreter could find the “truth” behind the facts and events that seem to be random, blind, brute and devoid of meaning, in a first moment of the film, to be totally or partially coherent and cohesive in the end. Such discovery provokes such an impact exactly because it requires a mental effort – energetic interpretant –, an emotional envolvement – emotional interpretant –, and, at the end, a reflection – logic interpretant – which allows one to tackle the elements involved and interrelated along the film. However, the way in which the spectator arrives at this outcome, i.e., when he or she discovers, solves, apprehends, cannot be nor at an early nor at a later stage; (see Santaella: 86) therefore, it ought to happen in a dynamic manner, but in the temporality of the events that occurs in the film.

2 On Time, Fluctuations and Complexities

In this sense, the evolution contained in that dialogy between the internal triad of the dymanic – emotional, energetic and logic – interpretant and the final interpretant triad – conjectural, propositional and argumental –, that is, between the semiotic place of the interpreter and the intentionality deposited in the film sign demands, especially, a time through which, and in which, the interpretant signs or ideas may associate and influence one another ad infinitum. Under this aspect, Peirce clarifies: “Three elements make up an idea. First, its intrinsic quality of feeling. Second, the energy with which it affects other ideas, an energy that is infinite in the here now of sensation, and finite in the recent past. The third element is the tendency an idea has to bring other ideas with it.” (Peirce, 1998: 258)

A fundamental element to this process, therefore, is the quality of feeling suggested, the energy or the power of projection upon another sign and the tendency the sign has to bring other signs with it, that is, the tendency to interrelate in a chain reaction and in a network. So, in systemic terms, such tendency each sign has in bringing, intrinsically, other signs, corresponds in observing their composition (number of related elements), their connectivity (the links among elements), the structure (the way these elements are related), their functionality (the function of each re-
lated element), their integrality (the consistency of the relation between these) and their organization (information area) within a flux of time.

Peirce points out that: “Time, as the universal form of change, cannot exist unless there is something that changes, so it is necessary that there be, continually, changeable qualities, so that there is a continuous change in time.” (Peirce, 1998: 256) Well, in its flux, the cinema is a succession of events in association, complementarity, antagonism and fluctuations, i.e., in intersemioses. Matter of fact, the temporality found in the cinema is only observed by the continuity of transformations, modifications and interactions that are captured, disposed and composed in the shots and their juxtapositions. That highlights that time means flux and that:

(...) it is necessary to affirm that consciousness occupies time intrinsically; and that which is present to the mind in any ordinary instant is that which is present during the moment in which this instant occurs. Therefore, the present is half past and half future. (Peirce, 1998: 254-255)

Consequently, one of the most remarkable facts concerning the law of mind is that its flux occurs from the past to the future. Now, the role of cinema is to offer the mind degrees of compatibility, reciprocity and affinity between that flux of the mind and the film, which would be equivalent to saying that the film would conquer the sensitivity, the attention and the continuous interest of the mind by means of the interactions, complementations and assotiations in course by projecting: (a) a beginning, which at first makes itself present; (b) which, later, becomes past; (c) but projecting it into the future or finality. Or as Peirce well observes: “The future is suggested, or better yet, is influenced, by the suggestions of the past.” (Peirce, 1998: 259)

It is this defined direction (Peirce, 1998: 255) – past-present-future – that makes the mind align itself with the flux of the film. It is true that some films elapse from the future to the past; however, the mind itself moves through this temporal order: under the suggestion of the past and projecting a future in a present which intersperses these two previous states. Thus, for the mind, these inter-relations between past, present, and future occur at the moment the film starts, develops and ends, regardless of the time of the story narrated by the film itself, the last moment being the decisive one, the stage of recognition, for in it, the area of information or intellective organization reaches its peak of complexity through which all the elements arrive at a conclusion, or close, mediated by the mind.

Meanwhile, before observing how an idea influences and generates others, that is, how the ideas flow through the mind, it is necessary to understand the three aspects that make up an idea. In its first character, there is the quality of feeling. Peirce explains that the feeling that grounds an idea cannot be encompassed or contained, for it is vague and open to continuous variations of intensity and dimensions (see Peirce, 1998: 256 and 258). However, a revived idea can ring a feeling similar to other moments in which that idea appeared in the mind: to that quality of feeling that repeats itself, and to which many times we refer to with expressions of fear, happiness, longing, joy, for example, Peirce names symbol of similarity. (see Peirce, 1998: 203-204)

So, the quality of feeling cannot be quantified, once it varies a great deal according to each particular mind. Nevertheless, such qualities of feeling can be suggested, provoked and perceived by the similarity of situations to which such feelings are associated. In fact, when one intends to project into the mind of the spectator a specific quality of feeling, the best way to suggest it is to work out situations in which that feeling surfaces the mind with the naturality which is common in the life of people, i.e., that which is activated is the memory of these people in relation to sim-
iliar situations and to the similar feelings related to those experiences. Consequently, the precision of the intensity with which that feeling seizes the mind cannot be measured, for it depends on the sensitivity of each mind; yet, still, such feeling can be suggested and perceived by the interpreter in various degrees. Matter of fact, it is in this scope that the emotional interpretant resides.

The second aspect observed by Peirce is the capacity an idea has to influence other ideas, i.e., the power this idea has to spread and circulate. Consequently, when “(...) an idea circulates, its power to affect others becomes rapidly reduced; nevertheless, its intrinsic quality remains relatively unchanged.” (Peirce, 1998: 258) Indeed, the quality of feeling associated with it becomes vague, continuous and limitless, for the following ideas are guided by that quality, by that common feeling. On the other hand, by circulating, the idea loses itself in others and the way to observe its degree of influence is by noticing its generalization, i.e., its flux in time: modifications, interactions and transformations into other ideas. It is for that reason that Peirce says that the future is suggested and influenced by the past, for, given the degree with which an idea is experimented, its energy to propel others, is spread *ad infinitum*. It is in this scope, therefore, that the mental action becomes preponderant, that the energetic interpretant predominates.

As for the logic interpretant, it resides under the auspices of the third aspect observed by Peirce bound to the law of mind: the tendency an idea has in interrelating with other ideas. Ideas can only propagate to the extent that they establish themselves and maintain a multiplicity of interactions, complementations and interrelations able to produce, develop, transform and modify other ideas. It is not something linear only; it is, especially, systemic.

An active system is characterized by its temporal process and its capacity of growth and development. The complexity of such temporal movement occurs through the diversity of connections that are made for the survival of the system. Therefore, its process is similar to the one found in a recursive-retroactive policircuit, (Morin, 2008: 231) for an idea – a generative one, i.e., which it has the tendency to generate others – possesses the character of, on the one hand, circularity – recursiveness –, and, on the other hand, the capacity to expand – of retroaction – to renew itself by means of other ideas.

The realization that the third aspect linked to the tendency of the idea/sign in interrelating with other signs so as to expand itself in a systemic manner – is exactly in the explanation that Peirce gives about necessary or diagrammatic reasoning:

> Every necessary reasoning is, without exception, diagramatic. That is, we build an icon of our hypothetic state of things and next we start observing it. This observation leads us to suspect that something – which we are able or not able to formulate with precision – is true or not, and afterwards we start investigating whether that something is true or not. To reach that goal, it is necessary to make out a plan of investigation, which is the hardest part of the whole operation. We not only have to select certain characteristics of the diagram to which it is not pertinent to pay attention to; it is also of utmost importance to resume constantly certain characteristics (recursiveness). Or else, and though our conclusions can be correct, they will not be the specific conclusions that we have in mind. But the supreme point of art consists in the introduction of adequate abstractions. That is why the transformation of our diagrams makes the characters of a diagram appear in another, transfigured in things (retroaction). A familiar example is when, in Analysis,
we deal with the operations as being themselves the subjects upon which we operate. (Peirce, 1998: 216)

To Peirce, there is a reciprocity between the law of nature and the law of mind, i.e., the natural phenomena are in conformity with the laws that rule them, exactly as our actions are in conformity with our beliefs. The difference is that the laws of nature are crystalized habits developed along millions and millions of years; as for the beliefs – theories and philosophies – which rule the human conduct, are malleable, flexible and subject to change. (see Santaella, 2004: 107) Now, if nature is systemic, the law of mind can only have a similarly systemic character. In fact, the law of mind propagates by means of a recursive-retroactive policircuit through which a series of diagrams are built, observed, reviewed, expanded and transformed by means of circle-evolutions – temporalities and multi-processes – through which the ideas themselves propagate. Indeed, circle-evolutions punctuated by logic found in thoughts: abductive/emergencies, deductive/interactions and inductive/regulations. (see Peirce, 1998: 260-261)

Matter of fact, the law of mind resembles the laws that rule the development of logic found in abduction, deduction and induction. (Peirce, 1998: 260) Thus, such tendency to bring other ideas with themselves occurs in a systemic manner, for an active system – as observed in the flux of thought – is open to the emergencies or to fluctuations, at the same time that it closes itself in regulations and self-control. Therefore, on the one hand, the film narrative opens the mind to conjectures and, on the other, it charges again from the mind the argument that moulds it, i.e., that rules it. Interspersing this process are the propositions that present themselves as dramatic facts and happenings that allow the mind to observe and visualize its inter-relations. This is the same as to say that the film narrative is the one that projects, suggests and triggers, in the mind, that dynamicity found in the logic circle-evolutions: abduction, deduction and induction.

In the face of those circle-evolutions, abduction appears as a fertile ground for emergencies, fluctuations, variations and interpretative oscillations. It occurs when the narrative promotes and suggests openings – links, bounds and nexus – in which the spectator spends a great deal of time probing, seeking, tracing and trying to understand the different characters, the situations in course and the disposed ways. In general, it happens in the beginning of the film, when the narrative exhibits the what, who, when, how and why of the dramatic toward which everything moves; however, this is not a rule. In fact, at all times, when the narrative proposes a cut, an unbalance and/or a crisis – called turning point by the theoreticians of the script –, the abductive process emerges as a field fecund to speculations and to hypothetic explorations. Consequently, in this abductive stage, the opening of the system is considerable and its borders are not at all fixed (Vieira, 2008: 61); however, along this process, there is a need for a greater stockage, that is, for the accumulation of memory, and that implies dispersion of time, data and attention. It is exactly for that reason that such kind of process, surrounded by instability and unbalance, besides being crucial for the resuming of the interpreter to the narrative axis through the bias of surprise, curiosity and renewed interest, deserves to be well dosaged, because, if kept, can lead to enthropic processes due to which the mind will not be able to organize the area of exposed information.

Indeed, with each speculation promoted by the crises and unbalances, another process starts: the deductive one. Thus, by means of deduction, the mind observes and glimpses at the recompositions between the relations of the facts, the connections of the new exposed elements, the form/structure of those new highlighted relations, the redefinitions in the functions of those elements inserted in the facts and events shown, the reintegration of
these in a whole, conferring a logic organization through which the mind projects an area of information in which the narrative flows.

In fact, scene after scene, the narrative supplies a net of information—costumes, objects of the scene, lights, colours, textures, scenarios, sites, interactions among actors, interactions among actors and the spaces, angles of vision, points of view, juxtapositions of images, sound tracks—which end up promoting the formation and transformation—recursivity and retroactivity—of these diagrams or deductions, because, for Peirce, necessary or diagrammatic thought is synonymous with deductive reasoning. Deduction, in turn, requires something of the nature of a diagram, (EP II, 1998: 442) for the need to pay attention to and foresee the logic relations between inter-related elements demands a capacity which allows that one glimpses at the links and the composed arrangements, examining its results and foreseeing its reach and progress. Therefore, deduction consists in the observation of the geometry proposed by the idea in course—or narrative—and the net of relations that it suggests, triggers and tends to, by experimenting with them, measuring them, demonstrating them from all angles and in a fully illuminated manner. (see Santaella, 2004: 152)

Indeed, in deduction, the mind follows the facts attentively as if they were “tracks” left by the narrative and such tracks allow a certain degree of linearity, for with each track “found,” it is possible to understand what is happening in the story and with the characters involved. Therefore, there is a certain reward with each correct deduction carried out by the mind, which implies gradual revelations up to the great end which, in a certain way, depend on the form it is arranged, it becomes cathartic, for, if sudden, but possible, it brings to the mind the question of admirability linked to the outcome. This means that, despite being perfectly logic, it was not foreseen by the mind of the spectator. In that way, despite having followed attentively all the tracks, and re-made and redimensioned the diagrams along the whole film, still, the narrative brought a conclusion, whose logicity is of a notorious beauty, though not foreseen.

Nevertheless, the field of catharsis, primarily an esthetic one, is also logically inductive. Deduction busies itself with glimpsing and observing the geometry of the systemic inter-relations of the speculative hypotheses suggested by abduction; however, the test, the verification and the refutation both of that which is measured by deduction and explored by abduction, occurs by the bias of induction. The narrative operates in an emphatic manner by proposition. As seen before, the proposition does not affirm nor deny the facts, it only introduces them. By presenting the facts and the events—those “tracks” left by the narrative—these open the mind to the formulation of hypotheses and the glimpse of the logic connections, though it is by means is by the inductive thought that such happenings acquire meaning in the mind.

In fact, the connections always demand the exercise of recursivity, of retroactivity, with each hypothesis and learning verified or refuted there is an increase in meaning—learning and knowledge—involving the whole system, or flux of ideas. The change of meaning brings about a new beginning and the whole system is affected. Thus, nuances and details that pass unnoticed in a first contact with the character, for example, appear, in a second contact, as if pregnant with meaningful value which reveal themselves crucial for one to understand the chain of enigmas in other moments of the narrative. Or better yet, objects and locations of minor importance, at first, come back with aggregate value, something that had not been seen at first. Consequently, this process repeats itself with every new knowledge acquired by being exhibited and outlined by the narrative.

So, induction becomes the moment through which the mind observes whether there is the need for readjustments, modifications or refutations to the hypotheses and re-
flections suggested and projected by abduction and deduction, according to Peirce. (EP II, 1998: 442) Thus, it is the narrative itself, when it exhibits the facts – propositions – which allows the mind to see, again, progressively, the knowledge the events generate in the mind. Indeed, the interpreter, at all times, tests the narrative design proposed by the film director, verifying if there is consistency in the organization of the facts – information area – in that which is exhibited, outlined and concluded.

Matter of fact, the climax occurs, in fact, when all the emotional, energetic and logic interpreters circle-evolve together with the abductive, deductive and inductive kinds of reasoning by means of multi-processes and meet at the end of the film when one sees that all the variations, realizations and interpretative regularities reach their intellective, emotional and energetic peak. That is, there is no linearity among those instants, the value or the quality of the system – or flux of thought – is in offering fluctuations, regularities, disorders, organization, antagonism, orders, diversity and unity, thus, complexity. Therefore, by generating ideas to the mind of the interpreter, the film makes the flux of thought a turmoil that expands itself and reverberates through many interpretative layers. Consequently, it does not act in a specific point – the emotional, or logic one, only, for example – but drags, rebounds, echoes, oscillates and irradiates through various spheres of the mind.

References


